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Prenatal Injuries From Passive Tobacco
Smoke: Establishing a Cause of Action
for Negligence
INTRODUCTION
Recent medical studies' have reported the discovery of harmful
effects that passive or involuntary smoking2 can have on a fetus.
Some of these effects include prenatal' injuries such as low birth
weight,4 variations in body length, 5 an increase in the possibility
of severe congenital malformations, and even perinatal6 mortality.7
Newly discovered medical evidence in this area can aid in devel-
oping a potential cause of action in tort for negligence causing
prenatal injuries.
Part I of this Comment outlines the development of a cause
of action for prenatal injuries.' Part II discusses various statutory
and constitutional theories imposing liability for injuries resulting
from the passive intake of tobacco smoke.9 Part III fuses the two
bodies of law discussed in Parts I and II and advances theories of
liability for prenatal injuries from passive smoke. 10
See infra notes 77-88 and accompanying text.
2 Fielding & Phenow, Health Effects of Involuntary Smoking, 319 (no. 22) NEw
ENG. J. MED. 1452 (Dec. 1, 1988) (Passive or involuntary smoking "occurs when non-
smokers are exposed to the tobacco smoke of smokers in enclosed environments."); Com-
ment, Adding Smoke to the Cloud of Tobacco Litigation-A New Plaintiff. The Involuntary
Smoker, 23 VA. U.L. REv. 111, 112 (1988) ("An involuntary smoker is one who invol-
untarily inhales cigarette smoke as a consequence of another's direct or active smoking.").
Prenatal is defined as "occurring, existing, or taking place before birth." WEBsTER's
NiNTH NEw COLLEGAuTE DIcTONARY 929 (9th ed. 1983).
See infra notes 5, 80, 81, 84, and 86 and accompanying text.
Schwartz-Bickenbach, Schulte-Hobein, Abt, Plum, & Nau, Smoking and Passive
Smoking During Pregnancy and Early Infancy: Effects on Birth Weight, Lactation Period,
and Cotinine Concentrations in Mother's Milk and Infant's Urine, 35 Toxic. LETTERs 73
(1987).
6 Perinatal is defined as "occurring in, concerned with, or being in the period around
the time of birth." WEBSTER's NNTH NEw COLLEGIATE DIcTONARY 874 (9th ed. 1983).
1 Letter to the editor from Daniel S. Seidman, M.D., 320 (no. 19) NEw ENoL. J.
MED. 1287 (May 11, 1989) (in response to Fielding & Phenow, supra note 2).
1 See infra notes 15-46 and accompanying text.
9 See infra notes 47-67 and accompanying text.
U0 See infra notes 68-120 and accompanying text.
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Various tort theories' enable one to impose liability for injuries
from voluntary tobacco smoke, but only theories of liability re-
garding passive smoking are addressed herein. Statutory and con-
stitutional theories are the most widely used bases of liability in
attempts to recover for injuries resulting from passive smoking.
However, their success has been limited. 12 Even though none of
these cases involve an action by a fetus, they are analogous to this
proposition in that all the plaintiffs request some type of relief
from the damaging effects of others' smoke. 3 Negligence has been
unused as the sole basis for liability for injuries from passive
smoke. The areas of recovery for prenatal injuries and liability for
injuries from passive smoke can be combined to develop a cause
of action for negligence resulting in prenatal injuries from passive
smoke.1 4
I. A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR PRENATAL INJyRIEs
In 1884, the majority of courts refused to acknowledge a cause
of action for prenatal injuries of any kind.'5 This view was followed
for over sixty years, 6 but gradually the decisions shifted to the
opposite conclusion, which firmly established the right to bring an
action for injuries incurred in utero.17 The recognition of this right,
however, depends upon viability, which is the point at which courts
will allow an action to be brought,'" and proof of the essential
elements of any negligence action-duty, breach of duty, causation,
and damage.' 9
The question of whether an injured fetus has a right of action
was first encountered in Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northampton .20
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes of the Massachusetts Supreme Ju-
" Comment, supra note 2, at 114-25 (theories include enterprise liability, strict liabil-
ity, alternative liability, and res ipsa loquitur).
,2 See infra notes 47-66 and accompanying text.
13 Id.
4 See infra notes 68-120 and accompanying text.
11 See, e.g., Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northampton, 138 Mass. 14 (1884).
36 See Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946).
11 See Amann v. Faidy, 114 N.E.2d 412, 415 (Ill. 1953) (a child suffering prenatal
injuries and born alive has a right of action for negligence); infra notes 30-45 and accom-
panying text.
,S See infra notes 30-45 and accompanying text.
Comment, Recognizing a Cause of Action for Preconception Torts in Light of
Medical and Legal Advancements Regarding the Unborn, 53 UMKC L. Rv. 78, 93 (1984).
0 138 Mass. 14 (1884) (wrongful death action by a woman 4 1/2 months pregnant
whose fall on a negligently maintained highway resulted in premature birth of her child).
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dicial Court authored the opinion, which was followed for over
sixty years. 21 The court held that an unborn child incapable of
surviving on its own has no separate existence and is not a person
in its own right. 22 Therefore, no duty of care could be owed to a
fetus.23
In the sixty years following Dietrich, courts offered additional
reasons24 for denying a cause of action. Some courts indicated that
a cause of action by the fetus is unnecessary since the mother can
recover for all her injuries, including those to the fetus.25 Proof
problems 26 and the fears of unsubstantiated claims concerned other
courts.27 Others stood behind the principle of stare decisis and the
lack of relevant legislation. 28 However, criticism of this view began
to increase 9 until the 1946 case of Bonbrest v. Kotz, 30 which
rejected the Dietrich approach.
In Bonbrest, the infant was injured while being removed from
the womb, and died shortly thereafter. The court declined to follow
Dietrich,31 holding that the child was not "part" of the mother
because it had demonstrated the ability to survive outside the
2! The sudden change in this well-established rule occurred in 1946 in Bonbrest, 65 F.
Supp. at 138.
2 Dietrich, 138 Mass. at 15; see also Comment, supra note 19, at 80 (discusses the
evolution of prenatal tort causes of action).
13 Dietrich, 138 Mass. at 15. Although Justice Holmes reportedly believed that there
was no remedy derived from common law, one court believed it more accurate to note
"that there was no English authority on either side of the question." Amann, 114 N.E.2d
at 416.
2, See generally Comment, supra note 19, at 81 (reasons offered by courts for denying
a cause of action).
" See Kirk v. Middlebrook, 100 S.W. 450 (Mo. 1907); Lipps v. Milwaukee Elec. Ry.
& Light Co., 159 N.W. 916 (Wis. 1916).
2 See Stanford v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 108 So. 566 (Ala. 1926) (overruled in
Huskey v. Smith, 265 So. 2d 598 (Ala. 1972) and Wolfe v. Isbell, 280 So. 2d 759 (Ala.
1973)); Magnolia Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Jordan, 78 S.W.2d 944 (Tex. 1935) (overruled
in Leal v. Pitts Sand and Gravel, Inc., 419 S.W.2d 822 (Texas 1967)).
" See cases cited supra note 26.
n See Drobner v. Peters, 133 N.E. 567 (N.Y. 1921); Berlin v. J.C. Penney Co., 16
A.2d 28 (Pa. 1940). See generally 62 AM. JuR. 2D Prenatal Injuries § 4, at 616 (1972)
(doctrine of stare decisis rejected).
" Justice Bogg's dissent in Allaire v. St. Luke's Hosp., 56 N.E. 638, 640 (I11. 1900),
would have allowed recovery for injuries inflicted four days before birth. In Dietrich, the
fetus was only 4 1/2 months old and did not survive. Justice Boggs distinguished Dietrich
using the viability issue. Allaire, 56 N.E. at 642. Allaire was overruled in Amann v. Faidy,
114 N.E.2d 418 (Ill. 1953).
65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946).
, Id. at 140. Dietrich was distinguished on the grounds that 1) the fetus in Dietrich
was not viable at the time of injury, and 2) the Dietrich fetus was injured indirectly through
its mother, not directly by the physician to the fetus as in Bonbrest.
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womb. Therefore, the fetus was determined to be viable thus giving
it standing to bring an action for any injuries.3 2 Bonbrest was then
distinguished from Dietrich in part because of the viability of the
fetus, which has been interpreted by some courts as a limitation
on recovery. 33
Following Bonbrest, courts developed various theories allowing
recovery for prenatal injuries, but were often troubled by the
viability requirement. Some courts allowed recovery for prenatal
injuries incurred any time after conception. 34 Many courts now
reject the viability limitation, which requires the fetus to be viable
at the time of injury and, for various reasons, allow an action for
prenatal injuries inflicted at any stage of fetal development as long
as the child is born alive.35 Since viability is determined by all
known methods at the very moment of injury, and not merely by
the age of the fetus, some courts find the viability rule practically
impossible to apply.36 Other courts adhere to the biological theory
in which the fetus is a separate entity from the moment of concep-
tion. 37 Another approach by courts allows recovery because claims
for injuries prior to fetal viability are no less substantial than those
for injuries occurring after fetal viability. 8
However, some jurisdictions still adhere to the viability rule.39
For example, in Orange v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insur-
ance Co., 4° the court characterized the issue to be "whether an
injury to a viable unborn child of the insured is an injury to 'a
32 Id.
11 See, e.g., Tursi v. New England Windsor Co., II1 A.2d 14 (Conn. Super. Ct.
1955); Steggall v. Morris, 258 S.W.2d 577 (Mo. 1953).
" See Kelly v. Gregory, 125 N.Y.S.2d 696 (N.Y. App. Div. 1953). This case rejected
the viability requirement because the court thought the problem of legal separability of the
mother and fetus could be eliminated by using biological separability. Using medical knowl-
edge concerning conception and fetal development, the court determined that separability
begins at conception because the fetus is a separate being and only relies on the mother for
protection and nutrients. Id. at 697. See generally Annotation, Liability for Prenatal Injuries
40 A.L.R. 3D 1222 (1971).
3' See Hornbuckle v. Plantation Pipe Line Co., 93 S.E.2d 727 (Ga. 1956); Smith v.
Brennan, 157 A.2d 497 (N.J. 1959); Sylvia v. Gobeille, 220 A.2d 222 (R.I. 1966).
36 See Smith, 157 A.2d at 504.
37 See Bonbrest, 65 F. Supp. at 140-41; Puhl v. Milwaukee Auto. Ins. Co., 99 N.W.2d
163 (Wis. 1959).
See Sylvia, 220 A.2d at 224.
See Orange v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 443 S.W.2d 650 (Ky. 1969), rev'd on
other grounds, Bishop v. Allstate Ins. Co., 623 S.W.2d 865 (Ky. 1981); Damasiewicz v.
Gorsuch, 79 A.2d 550 (Md. 1951); Williams v. Marion Rapid Transit, Inc., 87 N.E.2d 334
(Ohio 1949).
40 443 S.W.2d 650 (Ky. 1969).
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member of the family of the insured.' ,,41 The insurance company
sought a determination of whether it had a duty to defend an
insured wife under an automobile liability policy. The wife was
sued by her husband for the wrongful death of her unborn child;
the husband was the administrator of the child's estate. The policy
had an exclusion clause containing the terms "family" and "house-
hold." '42 Relying on precedent, 43 the court stated "[o]nce the stage
of viability is reached the fetus is regarded as a legal 'person' with
a separate existence of its own." 44 Therefore, the fetus was a
member of the class excluded by the insurance policy, and the
insurer did not have a duty to defend the action nor did it have
any liability.45
Nonetheless, the law is now well-established that a fetus has a
right of action for prenatal injuries that are negligently inflicted.
This is true whether the action is brought for common law negli-
gence, under negligence statutes, or under wrongful death statutes."
II. LIBmnrrY FOR [NIURIES FROM PASsIVE TOBACCO SMOKE
Various statutory and constitutional theories may impose lia-
bility for injuries resulting from the intake of involuntary tobacco
smoke. These are the most widely used bases of liability for this
cause of action. Although there has been no action by a fetus, the
theories are analogous to a proposed action by a fetus in that relief
is requested for damage from the effects of passive smoke.
A. Statutory Theories
Fetuses' claims for various injuries have not had much success
when the action is brought under a specific statute. Although the
following cases do not involve passive smoke, they demonstrate
possible barriers to recovery for prenatal injuries. In Singleton v.
4' Id. at 650.
42 Id. at 651 (The exclusionary clause provided that the insurance policy did not apply
"to bodily injury to the insured or any member of the family of the insured residing in the
same household.").
," The court relied on its previous decision in Mitchell v. Couch, 285 S.W.2d 901 (Ky.
1955).
. Orange v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 443 S.W.2d 650, 651 (Ky. 1969), rev'd on
other grounds, Bishop v. Allstate Ins. Co., 623 S.W.2d 865 (Ky. 1981).
4 Id. at 652.
" See Annotation, supra note 34, at 1228 (discusses theories on which liability for
prenatal injuries has been based).
1989-90]
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Ranz,47 the court held that an unborn fetus is not a "person"
within the meaning of the Florida Wrongful Death Act, 48 thus
barring the cause of action.49 However, the mother had a legal
cause of action for injury to her body because the fetus was "living
tissue ofthe body of the mother." 50 The absence of a live birth in
Witty v. American General Capital Distributors, Inc. ,5 also pre-
vented an action by the fetus under the Texas Wrongful Death
Act 2 and the Texas Survival Act.5 3
Carroll v. Tennessee Valley Authority 4 did not allow an action
by an adult for failure to maintain a smoke-free work environment
under the Federal Employee's Compensation Act.5 5 The negligence
claims were barred by an applicable exclusivity provision.16 In
Harman v. Daniels ' 7 an action under the Civil Rights Act"8 was
not allowed by an infant who received injuries in utero because
the fetus was not a "person" entitled to the constitutional protec-
tions of the Act.59
B. Constitutional Theories
Actions based on constitutional amendments normally are as
difficult to maintain as those based on statutory actions, but in
Avery v. Powell,6 the court allowed a cause of action for cruel
and unusual punishment under the eighth amendment.6' An inmate
brought an action against prison officials alleging that exposure to
environmental tobacco smoke subjected him to cruel and unusual
punishment. 62 The defendants' motion to dismiss claims under the
47 534 So. 2d 847 (Fla. Dist. Ct, App. 1988)._
43 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.19 (West 1986).
41 Singleton, 534 So.2d at 847-48.
5' Id. at 848.
SI 727 S.W.2d 503 (Tex. 1987).
52 Id. at 504, citing TEx. Crv. PRAc. & REM. CoDE ANN. § 71.002.
1 Id. at 506, citing TEx. CIv. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 71.021.
14 697 F. SUpp. 508 (D.D.C. 1988).
15 Id. at 511, citing 5 U.S.C. § 8101 et seq.
16 Id. (FECA provides a comprehensive and exclusive remedy for federal employees
who suffer work-related "injury or death.").
1' 525 F. Supp. 798 (W.D. Va. 1981).
11 Id. at 800-01, citing 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
59 Id.
10 695 F. Supp. 632 (D.N.H. 1988).
61 Id. at 640.
61 Id. at 633.
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fourteenth amendment for denial of liberty rights without due
process63 also was denied. 64
However, actions were disallowed under the first and fifth
amendments in Federal Employees for Non-Smokers' Rights
(FENSR) v. United States.65 -The court followed the reasoning of
Gasper v. Louisiana Stadium and Exposition District" in holding
that denial of the plaintiffs' right to petition the government for
relief was not an infringement on rights under the first amendment.
Nor under the fifth amendment was there a denial of life, liberty,
or property without due process of law.67
The cases discussed above represent possible hurdles a fetus
must overcome in order to maintain a cause of action under a
constitutional or statutory theory. Therefore, the establishment of
a cause of action for negligence for prenatal injuries from passive
smoke is necessary for relief in view of the limited success of
statutory and constitutional theories.
III. A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR PRENATAL INJURIES RESULTING
FROM PASSIVE SMOKE
A cause of action for negligence for prenatal injuries resulting
from passive tobacco smoke should be available by borrowing
established concepts from two areas of the law: recovery of dam-
ages for prenatal injuries and liability for injuries from passive
smoke. This extrapolation of these two areas is consistent with
their underlying rationales, as will be demonstrated.
A. Duty/Breach of Duty
The archaic theory that the fetus was a part of the mother,
had no separate existence of its own, and therefore, was not a
"person" to whom a duty could be owed has been discarded by
the courts.68 All jurisdictions permitting the recovery of damages
for prenatal injuries either recognize the existence of a separate
61 Id. at 641.
64 Id. at 644.
446 F. Supp. 181, 185 (D.D.C. 1978).
M 577 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1978) (finding no constitutional right to stop smoking by
others in the New Orleans Superdome while a performance is in progress).
67 Federal Employees for Non-Smokers' Rights v. United States, 446 F. Supp. 181,
185 (D2D.C. 1978).
" See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
1989-901
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entity 9 (contingent upon the viability limitation)70 or, "rely[ing] on
a basic sense of justice,"'7 recognize "that a child has a legal right
to begin life with a sound mind and body. ' 72
It follows from a recognition of a child's right to begin life in
good health that the general duty of care owed to a developing
fetus can be breached. Medical evidence points to ways that the
breach of the duty of care might occur. Evidence of the effects of
tobacco smoke on the unborn infant73 indicates that injuries to a
fetus from passive smoke may constitute a breach of duty to the
fetus in much the same way as the breach of duty occurs with
adults. Most of the prenatal injury cases involve negligence by
physicians74 or automobile accidents in which the fetus was in-
jured.75
B. Causation
More problematic than establishing a breach of duty to the
unborn by passive tobacco smoke is proof of causation. However,
this causal connection can be proven with medical evidence linking
passive smoke and fetal injuries.
69 See Kelly v. Gregory, 125 N.Y.S.2d 696 (App. Div. 1953); supra note 35.
70 See supra note 33.
1' Comment, supra note 19, at 85.
72 Smith v. Brennan, 157 A.2d 497, 503 (N.J. 1959); see also Womack v. Buchhorn,
187 N.W.2d 218 (Mich. 1971); Sylvia v. Gobeille, 220 A.2d 222, 223 (R.I. 1966).
11 See infra notes 77-88 and accompanying text. In order to attribute these health
risks to the exposure to cigarette smoke, whether passive or direct, a reliable means of
testing is necessary. The most promising biochemical marker of tobacco smoke is cotinine,
a metabolic by-product of nicotine. Cotinine from direct or passive exposure can be
accurately measured in serum, urine, or saliva.
A 1986 study demonstrated. the effect of involuntary smoke from the father on birth
weight. The average birth weight was reduced by 120 grams per pack of cigarettes (or cigar-
pipe equivalent) smoked per day. Martin and Bracken performed a similar study and
concluded that passive smoke exposure during pregnancy doubles a nonsmoker's risk of
having a growth-retarded infant and reduces birth weight by 24 grams. Even though this
amount may not be clinically significant, it increases the risk of the fetus aborting during
gestation.
Other studies have confirmed these findings of reduced birth weight in addition to
relating passive smoke to variations in body length, an increase in severe congenital defor-
mities, and perinatal mortality. This evidence demonstrates that the health risks to a fetus
are significant and warrant substantial public concern.
14 See Scott v. McPheeters, 92 P.2d 678 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 3d 1939); Bonbrest v.
Kotz, 65 F. Supp. at 138 (D.D.C. 1946).
73 See Amann v. Faidy, 114 N.E.2d 412 (Ill. 1953); Mitchell v. Couch, 285 S.W.2d
901 (Ky. 1955); Keyes v. Constr. Serv., Inc., 165 N.E.2d 912 (Mass. 1960); Womack, 187
N.W.2d 218; Smith, 157 A.2d 497; Leal v. C.C. Pitts Sand & Gravel, Inc., 419 S.W.2d
820 (Tex. 1967).
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If the wrongful conduct of another interferes with [the right to
begin life with a sound mind and body], and it can be established
by competent proof that there is a causal connection between the
wrongful interference and the harm suffered by the child when
born, damages for such harm should be recoverable by the child.7
6
The health risks of exposure to environmental tobacco smoke
are now widely known through publication of the Surgeon Gener-
al's Report of 198677 and the findings of the National Academy of
Sciences. 78 These reports similarly concluded that the involuntary
inhalation of cigarette smoke is harmful, 79 with the Surgeon
General's Report stating more specifically that it can cause diseases
such as lung cancer even in nonsmokers.80 Respiratory illness has
been noted by other studies as an adverse effect.81 A recent report
by the Environmental Protection Agency confirms these previous
studies and states that "passive smoke is one of the largest sources
of indoor-air pollution ' 82 and "presents a health hazard to workers
and others. ' 83 It follows that these dangers also pose a threat to
the unborn child. Therefore, extensive research has been done on
direct effects of maternal smoke throughout pregnancy and during
development of the fetus.84
Causation must be proven through a reliable means of testing,
which connects these health risks to the exposure to cigarette
smoke, whether passive or direct.85 Such testing has demonstrated
76 Smith, 157 A.2d at 503.
U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF
INVOLUNTARY SMOKING: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL (1986) (a report finding that
involuntary smoking may cause health problems).
78 NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, COMMITTEE ON PASSIVE SMOKING, ENVIRONMENTAL
TOBACCO SMOKE: MEASURING EXPOSURES AND ASSESSING HEALTH" EFFEcTs (1986) (a report
noting the harmful effects of environmental tobacco smoke).
79 See supra notes 77, 78 and accompanying text.
10 See Fielding & Phenow, supra note 2, at 1453.
11 See Martin & Bracken, Association of Low Birth Weight with Passive Smoke
Exposure in Pregnancy, 124 AM. J. Epm. 633, 633 (Oct. 1986).
82 Friend, EPA: Indoor Smoke is Big Pollutant, USA Today, June 20, 1989, at IA.
Friend & Collins, Workplaces Become New Battleground, USA Today, June 22,
1989, at IA.
14 See generally J. Haddow, Knight, Palomaki, & P. Haddow, Estimating Fetal
Morbidity and Mortality Resulting from Cigarette Smoke Exposure by Measuring Cotinine
Levels in Maternal Serum, 281 PRoG. CLIN. BIOL. RES. 289 (1988); Schwartz-Bickenbach,
Schulte-Hobein, Abt, Plum & Nau, supra note 5 (negative effects include low birth weight,
postnatal growth impairment, increased chance of premature birth and perinatal morbidity).
85 See generally J. Haddow, Knight, Palomaki, & P. Haddow, supra note 84, at 289




that involuntary smoke exposure during pregnancy reduces birth
weight significantly, 86 and also "doubles a nonsmoker's risk of
having a growth-retarded infant.11 7 Additionally, passive smoke
increases the possibility of severe congenital deformities and even
perinatal mortality.88
C. Damages
As in any negligence action, damages resulting from a legally
cognizable injury must be proven:8 9
The measure of damages [for prenatal injuries is] embraced within
three general elements: (a) compensation for the injury and re-
sulting impairment of mind and body, (b) compensation for the
cost of care necessitated by the injury and impairment including
the cost of probable future care, and (c) deprivation of normal
life expectancy.9
Damages for impairment of mind and body may include any
physical damages that could occur from congenital malformations
or premature birth, and "loss of the capacity for mental and
physical development. "91 Compensation for the cost of care in-
cludes "medical and nursing care and after minority" any costs
necessary for living independently, such as the cost of food, cloth-
ing, and shelter.92 Deprivation of normal life expectancy may result
in damages when the prenatal injuries are so severe that life ex-
pectancy is shortened. Therefore, "[a]ll damages representative of
a usual personal injury action should be recoverable. " 93
D. Liability and Possible Tortfeasors
Beyond establishing the elements of a cause of action for
negligent infliction of prenatal injuries from passive smoke, it must
11 See Rubin, Krasilnikoff, Leventhal, Weile, & Berget, Effect of Passive Smoking on
Birth-Weight, 8504 (no. 2) TiB LANCET 415 (Aug. 23, 1986); Haddow, Knight, Palomaki,
& McCarthy, Second-Trimester Serum Cotinine Levels in NonSmokers in Relation to Birth
Weight, 159 (no. 2) Am. J. OBsTET. GYN-ECOL. 481 (Aug. 1988); supra notes 5, 80, 81, and
84.
" Martin & Bracken, supra note 81, at 640.
0 See supra note 7.
11 See Comment, supra note 19, at 97.
10 Sox v. United States, 187 F. Supp. 465, 469 (E.D.S.C. 1960).
91 Id.
92 Id.
11 Comment, supra note 19, at 97.
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be determined who might be liable for those injuries. Possible
tortfeasors include a smoking parent, 94 an employer, 5 the cigarette
manufacturer, 96 and facilities where smoking is not restricted. 97
"Any person not protected by immunity may be held liable for
causing prenatal injuries, if the elements of actionable negligence
are proved." 98
An action against the father for prenatal injuries from passive
smoke may encounter barriers, such as statutory exclusions, if the
"unemancipated minor child cannot sue his parent for a personal
tort." 99 A few cases have addressed the parent's right to recover
damages, 100 suggesting that the mother may be able to sue the
father for any prenatal injuries caused by the father's tobacco
smoke; however, there are no holdings to this effect. Roofeh v.
Roofeh'0 1 involved parents and the effects of involuntary tobacco
9 See generally Allaire v. St, Luke Hospital, 56 N.E. 638 (I11. 1900) (possible liability
of the mother for prenatal injuries) overruled in Amann v. Faidy, 114 N.E.2d 418 (Ill.
1953); Roofeh v. Roofeh, 525 N.Y.S.2d 765 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1988) (husband sought order
of protection against wife to prevent her from smoking near him or their children).
91 See generally Carroll v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 697 F. Supp, 508 (D.D.C. 1988)
(employee brought suit against employer for failure to maintain a smokeless work environ-
ment); Federal Employees for Non-Smoker's Rights (FENSR) v. United States, 446 F. Supp.
181 (D.D.C. 1978) (groups and nonsmokers opposed to smoking brought suit to restrict
smoking in federal buildings to specified areas); Shimp v. New Jersey Bell Tel. Co., 368
A,2d 408 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1976) (employee sought and was granted an injunction
requiring her employer to initiate a smoking ban); Witty v. American Gen. Capital Dist.,
Inc., 727 S.W.2d 503 (Tex. 1987) (mother of deceased fetus brought action against her
employer to recover for prenatal injuries to the child).
See generally Comment, The Liability of Cigarette Manufacturers for Lung Cancer:
An Analysis of the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act and Preemption of Strict
Liability in Tort Against Cigarette Manufacturers, 76 Ky. L.J. 569 (1987-88) (analysis of
plaintiffs' strict liability claims against cigarette manufacturers based on inadequate warnings
and design defects); Comment, supra note 2, at 112 (third party involuntary smoker should
be able to sue cigarette manufacturers under the tort theory of enterprise liability).
97 See Avery v, Powell, 695 F. Supp. 632 (D.C.N.H. 1988) (inmate brought suit
against prison officials alleging that environmental tobacco smoke subjected him to cruel
and unusual punishment and deprived him of liberty). See generally Gasper v. Louisiana
Stadium & Exposition, 577 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1978) (action to discontinue smoking in the
New Orleans Superdome).
" 62 Am. JuR. 2D Prenatal Injuries § 20, at 627 (1980).
" Id. at note 16 (citing 59 AM. JuR. 2D Parent and Child § 151 (1987)). Annotation,
Liability for Prenatal Injuries 40 A.L.R. 3D 1222, 1252 (right of action by a child). But see
Rigdon v. Rigdon, 465 S.W.2d 921 (Ky. 1970) (the parental immunity rule, which precluded
a child from suing a living parent in tort, was annulled with exceptions), The liability of a
mother to her child during pregnancy will not be discussed because it does not involve
passive or involuntary smoke.
110 See Snow v. Allen, 151 So. 468 (Ala. 1933); Birmingham Baptist Hosp. v. Branton,
118 So. 741 (Ala. 1928); Davis v. Murray, 113 S.E. 827 (Ga. 1922); Dietrich v. Inhabitants
of Northampton, 138 Mass. 14 (Mass. 1884).
10, 525 N.Y.S.2d 765 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1988).
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smoke. The husband sought a protective order against his wife to
prevent her from smoking both in his presence and in the presence
of their children. The court refused to grant the order as requested
by the husband, but did restrict the mother's smoking to certain
areas, attempting to maintain the health of the husband and chil-dren. ,02
Since "[i]t is the employer who owes the duty to provide its
employees a safe place to work", 0 3 an employer also may be liable
for this new tort. The first case by an employee against an employer
regarding the health hazards of passive smoke was Shimp v. New
Jersey Bell Telephone.'° The plaintiff, a secretary for the phone
company, was allergic to cigarette smoke. She sought an injunction
to prevent her fellow employees from smoking on the job.' °5 Under
the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA)106 enacted in 1970,
it is an employer's duty "to eliminate all foreseeable and prevent-
able hazards."' 0 7 The court then took judicial notice that smoking
is dangerous to the health of a significant number of workers. 08
Therefore, the court granted the injunction concluding that this
was not a risk incidental to employment that the employee volun-
tarily assumed.'°9
Finding liability for damage to a fetus has not yet been suc-
cessful. In Witty v. American General Capital Distributors, Inc.,110
the mother of a deceased fetus brought suit against her employer
for prenatal injuries to the child and for individual claims of loss
of support and companionship, mental distress, emotional trauma,
and property damage for the loss of the unborn child."' These
claims failed under the Texas Wrongful Death Act"2 and the Texas
Survival Act"' because the fetus was not an "individual" or "per-
102 Id. at 769.
,01 Barnes v. Liberty Mut. Ins., 468 So. 2d 124 (Ala. 1985).
1-4 368 A.2d 408 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1976).
,o Id. at 409.
,- 29 U.S.C. § 651-78.
Io Shimp, 368 A.2d at 410.
'0 Id. at 414.
119 Id. at 411.
110 727 S.W.2d 503 (Tex. 1987).
"I Id. at 504.
142 Id. (Wrongful Death Act, Tax. Clv. PRAc. & REm. CODE ANN. § 71.002, does not
allow recovery for the death of a fetus).
1,3 Id. at 506 (Under TEx. Cry. PRAc. & REm. CODE ANN. § 71.021, damages are
recoverable only if there is a live birth).
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son" under the Wrongful Death Act ' 4 and because there was no
subsequent live birth."15
Cigarette manufacturers no longer enjoy complete immunity
from suit, and may be held liable for the death of cigarette smok-
ers."16 This recognition of the hazardous consequences of smoking ' 7
and increased public awareness will similarly result in the acknow-
ledgment of the harmful effects of passive smoking as well.
Although "the right to smoke in public places is not a protected
right,""118 the court in Gasper v. Louisiana Stadium and Exposition
District' 9 denied relief to a group of nonsmokers who wanted to
prohibit tobacco-smoking in the New Orleans Superdome. How-
ever, the court stated:
We assume that the Superdome authorities, if they saw fit, could
prohibit smoking in the facility, or the City of New Orleans in
the exercise of its police power could prohibit smoking in public
stadiums, or the State of Louisiana could enact a similar statute
of state wide application. No such rule, city ordinance, or state
statute has been enacted.1 20
The essential elements of any cause of action for negligence can
be proven. Therefore, recovery should be allowed for prenatal
injuries resulting from passive tobacco smoke.
CONCLUSION
Today, the right of a fetus to bring suit for negligently inflicted
prenatal injuries is firmly established' 2' even though some jurisdic-
tions still adhere to the viability requirement.' 22 This right also
should be inclusive of actions in tort for negligence for injuries
caused by the harmful, possibly fatal, 23 effects of passive or in-
voluntary tobacco smoke. These effects have been noted and con-
I14 d. at 504 (The court examined legislative intent and determined that the words
"individual" and "person" in TEx. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 71.002(b) do not
encompass an unborn fetus.).
"I Id. at 506.
116 See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
" Id.
"I Craig v. Buncombe County Bd. of Educ., 343 S.E.2d 222, 223 (N.C. App. 1986).
119 577 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1978).
M Id. at 898.
,2, See supra notes 29-38 and accompanying text.
'2 See supra notes 33 and 39.
'M See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text.
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clusively proved by medical researchers only in the last few years, 124
with the Surgeon General recognizing these findings in his 1986
report.' 25 This medical evidence cannot be ignored and, as the
general public's awareness of the dangers of passive smoke in-
creases, a new recognition of liability for these injuries will emerge,
An individual may possess a greater awareness of the risk of harm
than the general public if notice is given by the mother that passive
smoke is damaging to the health of her unborn child. Thus, a
stronger case is presented because direct or superior knowledge
increases the standard' of care for a reasonable person, as well as
establishing that the injuries were foreseeable. 2 6
It is the duty of any person to assume liability for all injuries
proximately caused by his or her negligent act. An injured fetus
must be given an opportunity to prove the elements of a negligence
action in order to have a means of redress. As medical knowledge
increases with new research, proof of these injuries will become
easier to establish. "A child has a fundamental right to live in an
environment free from filth, health hazards and danger."' 27 This
right should not exclude the unborn child because proper devel-
opment of the fetus is highly dependent upon its environmental
surroundings. 128
Therefore, through the fusion of the areas of recovery for
prenatal injuries and liability for passive smoke injuries, the courts
should acknowledge that a viable cause of action for negligence
truly exists for prenatal injuries inflicted by passive tobacco smoke.
Julie E. Lippert
'1 See supra notes 80-86 and accompanying text.
'2 See supra note 77.
'26 See generally W. PROSSER, LAw OF TORTS § 32 (4th ed. 1971).
,2 In re MLM v. Kuchera, 682 P.2d 982, 990 (Wyo. 1984) (dispute over parental rights
with respect to three daughters).
121 See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
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